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I. INTRODUCTION 
The New York Times recently reported that the United States 
incarcerates one in 100 adults.1 This staggering figure brings into 
perspective the social policies surrounding sentencing jurisprudence in 
this country and the paramount importance of ensuring that the judiciary 
can effectively implement penological policy in a constitutional manner. 
Recently, the Supreme Court has recognized the inherent collision 
between the mandatory application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury.2 
The heart of the debate centers on who should ultimately decide the 
factual basis for increasing a criminal defendant’s sentence and what 
policies should be taken into account when crafting an individualized 
sentence.3 The serious practical implications of this jurisprudential 
debate take on an increasing sense of urgency against the backdrop of an 
exploding prison population.4 The Supreme Court recently addressed 
                                                                                                             
 1 Adam Liptak, U.S. Imprisons One in 100 Adults, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
29, 2008, at A14. 
 2 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
 3 See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones 
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 4 The prison population grew last year by 25,000 people, bringing the total prison 
population to almost 6 million. The last three decades has seen the total prison population 
nearly triple. The report also found that “[i]ncarceration rates are even higher for some 
groups. One in 36 adult Hispanic men is behind bars, based on Justice Department figures 
for 2006. One in 15 adult black men is, too, as is one in nine black men aged 20 to 34.”  
Liptak, supra note 1. 
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some of these issues, albeit narrowly, in Rita v. United States5 and United 
States v. Gall.6 
In Rita, Justice Souter began his dissent with what is perhaps an 
understatement: “[a]pplying the Sixth Amendment to current sentencing 
law has gotten complicated, and someone coming cold to this case might 
wonder how we reached this point.”7 Indeed, since the Supreme Court 
issued its landmark sentencing decision in United States v. Booker8 
changing the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, the exact operation 
of the discretionary scheme has fueled contention and litigation.9 In 
particular, circuit courts struggle to apply the reasonableness standard of 
review mandated by the remedial portion of Booker, vindicating Justice 
Scalia’s characteristically caustic remark that such an inchoate standard 
would create a “discordant symphony of different standards varying from 
court to court and judge to judge. . . .”10   
Despite the Supreme Court’s most recent sentencing decisions, 
reasonableness review remains problematic. The Court’s decisions in 
Rita and Gall have reinforced a tendency among the circuit courts to 
review sentences that deviate from the Guidelines in a manner 
inconsistent with the advisory scheme mandated in Booker.11 In 
                                                                                                             
 5 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 6 United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). A companion case was 
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that 
a court may “consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and 
powder cocaine offenses.” Id. at 564. Kimbrough, however, is beyond the scope of this 
comment’s focus on the Court’s treatment of reasonableness review in Rita and Gall. 
 7 Id. at 2484 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 8 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); Rita v. United States, 
127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 10 Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11 See United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a downward 
departure unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) factors); United States v. 
Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court did not 
appropriately weigh the factors under section 3553 of the Guidelines); United States v. 
Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the sentence reflected an 
overemphasis on the relevance of the details of the offense and the defendant’s history 
under section 3553(a)(1) and accorded insufficient weight to existing congressional 
policy and the need to minimize sentencing disparities); United States v. Hatcher, 501 
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the sentence because the district court gave too much 
weight to an improper factor); United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 
2007) (concluding that district court ignored Congress’s policy of targeting recidivist 
drug offenders for more severe punishment and failed to distinguish the defendant from 
other career offenders); Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing sentence as 
substantially unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh sentencing 
factors); United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing sentence 
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particular, the presumption of reasonableness endorsed in Rita further 
insulates within-Guidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory 
scheme.12 The reasonableness standard of review remains ambiguous, 
enabling circuit courts to effectively review sentences de novo, in further 
contravention of Booker.13 In addition, reasonableness review is 
vulnerable to as-applied challenges, similar to those raised in Booker.14 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the Guidelines as the 
centerpiece of sentencing perpetuates a misguided system held to be 
unconstitutional in Booker. 
Central to these issues is the interplay between the substantive and 
procedural reasonableness review. Substantive review requires an inquiry 
into the sufficiency of the factors the sentencing court considered during 
sentencing, whereas procedural review ensures that the lower court took 
the appropriate factors into consideration.15 This comment proposes that 
the Supreme Court should effectuate a procedural review that would 
allow an appellate court to reverse a sentence only if the sentencing court 
relied on inappropriate or clearly erroneous facts. Such a system would 
ensure that sentencing judges truly have discretion to impose a sentence 
within the statutory range as required by Booker.  
Furthermore, this comment suggests that the Supreme Court should 
deemphasize the Guidelines as a starting point in the sentencing process 
by stressing the reasoned analysis of the statutory sentencing factors, 
including but not privileging the Guidelines. These reforms would 
promote the integrity of the current Sixth Amendment sentencing 
jurisprudence developed through a complex line of cases. 
The Constitutional cracks in the mandatory Guidelines scheme 
began to emerge after a series of cases asserted that the Guidelines 
                                                                                                             
because district court gave too much weight to irrelevant factor); United States v. 
D’Amico, 496 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality review and reversing 
sentence as substantially unreasonable). But see United States v. Sanchez-Ramirez, 497 
F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding sentence under the Guidelines as reasonable in light 
of the defendant’s egregious conduct); United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming sentence 
that fell within the Guidelines as substantially reasonable, and applying presumption of 
reasonableness); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
sentence that fell below the range in the Guidelines as substantively reasonable). 
 12 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). 
 13 See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated, reh’g 
granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). Despite being vacated, this does not change the 
relevance of the opinion, and perhaps further illustrates the difficulties that the circuit 
courts face in applying the reasonableness standard of review. United States v. Tomko, 
No. 05-4997, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 988 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (order vacating 
judgment and granting rehearing). 
 14 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 15 United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 
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effectively transferred the fact-finding function from the jury to the 
judge.16 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court examined a New 
Jersey hate-crime statute that increased the defendant’s sentence upon a 
judicial finding that the offense was committed “with purpose to 
intimidate,” holding it unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.17 
Subsequently, in Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
state sentencing scheme that, like the federal Guidelines, calculated 
sentences based on judge-found factors.18 Finally, in United States v. 
Booker, the Supreme Court held the mandatory application of the 
Guidelines as unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, and required 
appellate courts to review sentences for reasonableness instead of using a 
de novo standard.19 
Booker, however, provided little guidance to courts applying 
reasonableness review.20 Consequently, divergent interpretations among 
the circuit courts of appeals began to emerge concerning the scope and 
operation of Booker.21 Some courts viewed Booker as transforming the 
Guidelines-dominated or Guidelines-centric approach of the post-
Sentencing Reform Act era into a system that relegates the Guidelines as 
one sentencing factor among several policy considerations outlined by 
Congress.22 Other courts continued to give great weight to the Guidelines 
both in application and in review.23 Courts embracing the latter view 
have adopted two distinct doctrinal approaches: (1) the presumption of 
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, and (2) the requirement 
that district court judges provide proportionately compelling reasons 
whenever sentences substantially deviate from the Guidelines, a doctrine 
known as the “proportionality principle.”24 The Supreme Court recently 
                                                                                                             
 16 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 17 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 18 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004). 
 19 Booker, 543 U.S. at 226. 
 20 See id. at 261–62. 
 21 See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle); United States v. Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 
(8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle). 
 22 See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 666–70 
(2006) (citing a statistical analysis of courts continuing to impose sentences within the 
Guidelines and of courts that viewed Booker as minimizing the effect of the Guidelines 
on sentencing determinations). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (reviewing appellate court’s 
adoption of presumption of reasonableness); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) 
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considered these approaches in Rita v. United States25 and Gall v. United 
States,26 respectively.  
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that an appellate presumption of 
reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence is consistent with 
reasonableness review.27 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gall28 rejected 
the Eighth Circuit’s application of the “proportionality principal.”29 
Taken together, the Court’s most recent sentencing jurisprudence 
illustrates the difficulties of fashioning a cohesive sentencing regime that 
effectively reconciles policy and Constitutionality. Although the 
Supreme Court has taken substantial steps to rectify ambiguities in 
federal sentencing jurisprudence, the circuit courts continue to confront 
the difficult task of reviewing sentences under a reasonableness standard 
that remains vague and difficult to apply.30 In essence, Justice Scalia’s 
lamented “discordant symphony” 31 remains at full volume. 
Two recent circuit court decisions that represent the problems 
associated with applying reasonableness review are United States v. 
Tomko32 and United States v. Wachowiak.33 In Tomko, the Third Circuit 
provided a particularly lengthy discourse between the majority and the 
dissent as to the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing a sentence 
in light of Rita.34 The majority reversed the district court’s sentence, 
concluding that the judge improperly weighed the sentencing factors.35 
The dissent in Tomko argued that the majority had essentially reviewed 
                                                                                                             
(reviewing appellate court’s adoption of proportionality principle); United States v. 
Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle); United States 
v. Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle). 
 25 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 26 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 586. 
 27 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456. 
 28 Originally, the Supreme Court considered the issue of proportionality in United 
States v. Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), a companion case to Rita. However, 
Claiborne’s death rendered the case moot, delaying the Court’s consideration of the issue 
until the following term. 
 29 Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591. Originally, the Supreme Court considered th issue of 
proportionality in United States v. Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), a companion case 
to Rita. However, Claiborne’s death rendered the case moot, delaying the issue until the 
following term. Id. 
 30 See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (arguing that the 
majority’s re-weighing of the factors cited to support the lower court’s sentence was 
tantamount to de novo review); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 
2007) (upholding sentence as substantively reasonable despite disagreeing with the 
sentencing court’s analysis of the sentencing factors). 
 31 Booker, 543 U.S. at 303–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 32 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 33 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 34 See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 159–85. 
 35 See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 173. 
2008] Is Substantive Review Reasonable? 453 
the sentence de novo in contravention of both Rita and Booker.36 In 
Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit upheld a sentence that deviated from the 
Guidelines, noting that although reasonable minds could differ as to the 
appropriateness of the sentence, Booker and Rita required deferential 
treatment of the district court’s judgment.37  
In essence, the scope and application of reasonableness review 
remain problematic. This confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s 
failure in Rita and Gall to address several fundamental criticisms of 
reasonableness review. Specifically, the Supreme Court: (1) endorsed a 
presumption of reasonableness review that further insulates within-
Guidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory guideline system; 
(2) failed to provide adequate guidance for both appellate and district 
courts as to the scope and application of substantive reasonableness 
review; (3) left intact a conception of substantive review vulnerable to 
as-applied constitutional challenges; and (4) issued opinions replete with 
misguided Guidelines-centric language that frustrates the remedial 
mandate of Booker. 
In order to remedy the fundamental flaws inherent in the current 
reasonableness review scheme, the Supreme Court should elevate 
procedural review over substantive review to create a system in which 
appellate courts could only reverse sentences that relied on 
impermissible factors or clearly erroneous facts. In doing so, the Court 
would preserve the integrity of the advisory scheme enacted under 
Booker by giving sentencing judges true discretion to depart from the 
Guidelines. Furthermore, the Court should underscore the totality of the 
statutory factors enacted by Congress as the basis for sentencing rather 
than emphasizing the Guidelines. This “parsimony-centric” approach 
recognizes the overarching sentencing instruction mandated by Congress 
requiring that a sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to 
achieve the legislative goals.38 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW 
Federal sentencing changed dramatically after the enactment of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.39 Prior to the statute, Congress gave 
                                                                                                             
 36 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 37 United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 38 See Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49–50 (2005) (discussing the development of the parsimony principle 
and its relationship to section 3553). Although this comment has not revealed a credited 
source for the term “parsimony-centric,” it will use the term to refer to what Michael W. 
McConnell described as “Booker-maximalism,” coupled with an emphasis on the 
statutory parsimony principle. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 666. 
 39 Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 
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judges wide latitude to impose sentences within the statutory range set 
forth under the substantive law.40 This broad discretion created the 
perception that different judges would impose disparate sentences for the 
same offense.41 Therefore, Congress created the Sentencing Commission 
and charged it with the task of promulgating a system that would guide 
judicial discretion in a manner consistent with the penological goals of 
punishment outlined in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.42 Pursuant to 
this mandate, the Sentencing Commission produced the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, a rubric which establishes a sentencing 
subrange43 based on an offender’s criminal history and offense level.44 
After nearly a decade of mandatory application of the Guidelines to 
sentences, several cases challenged the constitutionality of the system.45 
The most significant of these early challenges was Apprendi v. United 
States,46 followed shortly thereafter by Blakely v. Washington.47 The 
defendants in each case challenged the constitutionality of the sentencing 
statutes in each respective state. These statutes required a trial judge to 
make findings of fact independent of the jury in order to enhance 
sentences.48 In both cases, the defendants argued that such judicial 
findings of fact violated their Sixth Amendment right to a jury.49 The 
Supreme Court agreed with the defendants in each instance, opening the 
field for challenges to the federal Guidelines system.50 The successful 
challenge appeared in United States v. Booker,51 a landmark decision that 
                                                                                                             
 40 Roger W. Haines, Jr., Federal Sentencing Guidelines Handbook, 1 (2006); See 
also Berman, supra note 38, at 3. 
 41 See Haines, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that one of the goals of the Sentencing 
Commission was to promote uniformity). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Subrange is a term of art used to describe the Guidelines range of sentencing 
established within the statutory range under the substantive law. See, e.g., Rita v. United 
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2486 (2007). 
 44 Haines, supra note 40, at 1. 
 45 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 46 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 47 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 48 See id. at 298; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. Blakely plead guilty to 
kidnapping charges. Blakely, 530 U.S. at 298. The facts admitted in the plea agreement 
authorized a sentence of fifty-three months, however the sentencing judge imposed an 
additional ninety months, finding that Blakely qualified for an “exceptional” 
enhancement. Id. Similarly, Apprendi plead guilty to charges related to shooting into a 
home and received an enhanced sentence under a New Jersey hate-crime law. Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 468–69. 
 49 See id. at 298; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
 50 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497. 
 51 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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rendered the mandatory Guidelines scheme unconstitutional, and 
substituted an advisory scheme whereby appellate courts were to review 
sentences under a new “reasonableness” standard.52 Left with little 
guidance from the Supreme Court, however, the circuit courts of appeals 
began to develop their own principles to facilitate the new sentencing 
system.53 
One practice that arose within the circuits is the judicial application 
of a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences. In 
Rita v. United States, the Supreme Court held this presumption 
constitutional in light of Booker.54 Other circuits began to apply a 
proportionality principle to sentencing, essentially requiring district 
courts to justify a sentence in relation to the amount the sentence varied 
from the Guidelines range.55 For example, if a sentence reflected a 100% 
variance from the established Guidelines range, the sentencing judge 
would have to provide the strongest possible justification for the 
sentence.56 In Gall v. United States, however, the Supreme Court struck 
down this doctrine, finding a violation of Booker’s mandate that district 
court sentences be afforded due deference under reasonableness review.57 
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing 
Commission 
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the Act”)58 
to establish the statutory framework for sentencing within the federal 
judiciary. The Act instructs the sentencing judge to impose a sentence 
consistent with the policy statements set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.59 
Pursuant to section 3553(a), a judge must consider: (1) the characteristics 
of the offense and the offender; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the 
basic aims of sentencing, which are just punishment, retribution, 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally 
available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) the Sentencing Commission 
policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7) 
the need for restitution.60 Guiding the policy statements is the so-called 
                                                                                                             
 52 Id. at 245. 
 53 See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 177 F. App’x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 127 S. Ct. 
2456 (2007) (applying presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 
884 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (applying proportionality principle). 
 54 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007). 
 55 See, e.g., United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 56 See id. 
 57 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 58 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006). 
 59 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006). 
 60 Id. at § 3553(a)(1)–(7). 
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“parsimony principle,” which instructs the judge to “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve these basic 
objectives.61 The provision also provides that when the court announces a 
punishment, it must state the reasons for imposing a particular sentence 
in open court.62 
At the same time, Congress established the United States 
Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”), an independent agency in 
the judicial branch,63 in order to facilitate the policy goals set forth by 
Congress.64 Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission65 created the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines,66 a comprehensive manual that 
provides sentencing ranges based on a defendant’s criminal history and 
the severity of the criminal conduct.67 In order to maintain flexibility, the 
Guidelines provide that a sentence may “depart” from the applicable 
Guidelines range if the sentencing judge identifies factors not taken into 
consideration by the Commission.68 Under the original Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984, a within-Guidelines sentence was mandatory,69 and, 
pursuant to a subsequent provision enacted in 2003, was reviewable by 
an appellate court de novo.70 
                                                                                                             
 61 Id. at § 3553(a). 
 62 Id. at § 3553(c). 
 63 An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2008). 
 64 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006) (indicating that the Sentencing Commission’s basic 
objectives are to “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 
3553(a)(2). . . .” In addition, the Commission “must seek to ‘provide certainty and 
fairness’ in sentencing, to ‘avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,’ to ‘maintain 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing 
practices,’ and to reflect to the extent practicable [sentencing-relevant] advancement in 
[the] knowledge of human behavior.”). See also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464. 
 65 The Commission is comprised of seven voting members appointed by the president 
and confirmed by the senate. No more than three of the members may be federal judges 
and no more than four may belong to the same political party. See supra note 63. 
 66 The Commission took an “empirical approach,” examining thousands of pre-
sentence reports and making adjustments in accordance with congressional instructions. 
Haines, supra note 40, at 1. 
 67 See supra note 63. 
 68 Id. 
 69 One provision provides that the court “shall impose” a within-Guideline sentence 
“unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a 
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from 
that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(2). As discussed later in this comment, the 
mandatory language within this provision was held to be unconstitutional in the remedial 
portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 70 The Court first considered the issue of appellate review in Koon v. United States, 
518 U.S. 81 (1996), holding that the appropriate standard of review for sentences is abuse 
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B. Jones v. United States: A Sixth Amendment Challenge 
Although the Supreme Court rejected any initial constitutional 
challenges to the Guidelines system on separation of powers grounds,71 a 
new line of cases raising Sixth Amendment issues eventually 
undermined the federal mandatory Guidelines system and similar state 
sentencing schemes.72 The first significant challenge of this nature was 
Jones v. United States.73  
In Jones, the government convicted the defendant under a statute 
that provided for a substantial increase in the maximum penalty 
depending on whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in “serious 
bodily injury” or “death.”74 In the case, the indictment failed to reference 
the specific provision carrying the heightened penalty or the alleged facts 
consistent with that provision.75 However, the trial court, upon a finding 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct resulted 
in “serious bodily injury,” imposed the higher sentence.76  
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the Sixth Amendment77 
implications that occur when a judge makes a factual finding which 
increases a defendant’s exposure to a higher sentence.78 Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
of discretion. However, Congress subsequently overruled Koon and changed the standard 
of review to de novo under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006). 
 71 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (holding that the Sentencing 
Guidelines reflect neither an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority nor a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine). 
 72 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 73 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 74 Id. at 230. 
 75 Id. at 230–31. 
 76 Id. at 231. 
 77 U.S. CONST. amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
 78 Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. (“[T]here is reason to suppose that in the present 
circumstances, however peculiar their details to our time and place, the relative 
diminution of the jury’s significance would merit Sixth Amendment concern. It is not, of 
course, that anyone today would claim that every fact with a bearing on sentencing must 
be found by a jury; we have resolved that general issue and have no intention of 
questioning its resolution. The point is simply that diminishment of the jury’s 
significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range 
would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth 
Amendment issue not yet settled.”). 
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the Court construed the statute as establishing three separate offenses 
with distinct elements that the prosecution must prove to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.79 However, the decision was limited to the specific 
provision at issue, effectively obviating the Sixth Amendment issues 
troubling the Court.80 
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey: A State Sentencing Enhancement Violates 
the Sixth Amendment 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court confronted a similar 
challenge in Apprendi v. New Jersey.81 In Apprendi, the defendant pled 
guilty to charges relating to a series of shootings82 which, pursuant to a 
plea agreement, carried a maximum sentence of ten years.83 However, on 
motion by the prosecution,84 the judge imposed a sentence of twelve 
years under New Jersey’s “hate crime” law.85 The state law explicitly 
provided for an “enhanced” sentence if the judge found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the offense 
“with purpose to intimidate.”86  
Faced squarely and inescapably with the Sixth Amendment issue 
raised but not decided in Jones,87 the Supreme Court held that, in the 
absence of a jury waiver, jury-found facts prescribed the statutory 
maximum.88 Drawing heavily on the fundamental constitutional 
protections afforded under the Sixth Amendment, the Apprendi majority 
“recognized that the [Sixth Amendment] jury right would be trivialized 
                                                                                                             
 79 Id. at 253. A defendant can waive the right to a jury, in which case a judge would 
be the sole fact-finder. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 80 The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in which a 
court interprets a statute in a manner that avoids constitutional issues. In Jones, the 
majority bypassed the direct constitutional question by interpreting the statute at issue to 
require “serious bodily injury” as an element of the crime. Rita v. United States, 127 S. 
Ct. 2456, 2485 (J., Stevens, dissenting) (characterizing Jones as applying the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance.). 
 81 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 82 Apprendi fired shots into the home of an African-American family and later stated 
that he desired to keep the family out of the neighborhood. Apprendi later retracted that 
statement. Among other counts, he pled guilty to weapons charges carrying a maximum 
penalty of five to ten years. Id. at 469. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution reserved the right to request the 
enhancement and Apprendi reserved the right to appeal on Constitutional grounds. Id. at 
470. 
 85 Id. at 471. 
 86 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West 2007). 
 87 The Court could no longer apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance because 
the New Jersey statute expressly provided for heightened exposure based on facts found 
by the judge. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2485 (J., Stevens, dissenting). 
 88 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
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beyond recognition if that traditional practice could be extended to the 
point that a judge alone . . . could find a fact necessary to raise the upper 
limit of a sentencing range.”89 Thus, in extending the constitutional right 
to a jury,90 the Supreme Court established a precedent that seriously 
questioned the legitimacy of a mandatory Guidelines scheme. 
D. Blakely v. Washington: Sixth Amendment Challenges to State 
Sentencing Guidelines 
In Blakely v. Washington,91 the Supreme Court considered a Sixth 
Amendment challenge to a state sentencing system similar to the federal 
Guidelines system. The defendant pled guilty to kidnapping charges 
carrying a statutory maximum of ten years.92 However, under 
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, a state analogue to the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines, the trial court calculated a subrange 
sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months.93 The analogue further 
provided that a judge could depart from the standard sentencing range 
and impose “an exceptional sentence” upon a finding of certain 
aggravating factors.94  
The trial court rejected the government’s recommendation of a 
standard-range sentence and imposed a sentence of ninety months 
(greater than the forty-nine-to-fifty-three-month range established by the 
jury verdict alone).95 The sentencing judge based this upward departure 
upon a finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.”96 
In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that in order to comport with 
the Sixth Amendment, the government must submit to a jury and prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt any fact necessary to enhance a sentence 
beyond a statutory subrange.97 The Blakely Court rejected the notion that 
a judge could enhance a sentence beyond the subrange authorized by the 
jury.98 Thus, the “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the 
                                                                                                             
 89 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497. 
 91 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004). Also note that the Court limited 
its discussion to the scope of the Sixth Amendment without reference to the incorporation 
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
 92 Id. at 299. Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife. Id. at 296. 
 93 Id. at 300. 
 94 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2485 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing the holding in Blakely). 
 95 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300. 
 96 Id. at 300. 
 97 Id. at 313. 
 98 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 331 (2005); see Rita v. United States, 127 
S. Ct. at 2487 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If Blakely had come out the other way, the 
significance of Apprendi itself would be in jeopardy: a legislature would be free to bypass 
Apprendi by providing an abnormally spacious sentencing range for any basic crime 
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maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts 
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”99 
E. United States v. Booker: The Advent of the Advisory Guidelines 
System and Reasonableness Review 
After Blakely, a Sixth Amendment challenge to the federal 
Guidelines system followed in United States v. Booker,100 marking the 
advent of the advisory Guidelines system and reasonableness review. 
The government convicted Booker of possession with the intent to 
distribute, which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under 
the applicable statute.101 The trial court’s calculation using the Guidelines 
took into account both Booker’s criminal history and the quantity of 
drugs established by the conviction, resulting in a sentence range of 210–
262 months.  
At sentencing, however, the judge concluded that Booker actually 
possessed a higher quantity of drugs and was guilty of obstruction of 
justice.102 Accordingly, the judge imposed a thirty-year sentence (a 
sentence substantially higher than the sentence authorized by the jury’s 
verdict).103 Addressing the substantive issues presented by the case, a 
narrow majority in the Supreme Court104 extended the holding in Blakely 
to the federal Guidelines.105 The Court concluded that the same Sixth 
Amendment requirements operative in the Washington sentencing 
scheme applied to the federal Guidelines.106 The majority in the 
substantive portion of the opinion acknowledged that the mandatory 
nature of the Guidelines created the constitutional deficiency.107 
However, the Justices disagreed over the appropriate remedy.108 
                                                                                                             
[theoretically exposing a defendant to the highest sentence just by the jury’s guilty 
verdict], then leaving it to a judge to make supplementary findings not only appropriate 
but necessary for a sentence in a subrange at the high end. That would spell the end of 
Apprendi and diminish the real significance of jury protection. . . .”). 
 99 Booker, 543 U.S. at 232 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 100 Id. The decision consolidated two cases: United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 
(7th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Fanfan, 03-47-P-H (D. Me. Jun. 28, 2004). This 
comment only addresses the facts in the Booker case. 
 101 Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Justice Stevens delivered the substantive portion of the opinion with Justices 
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joining. 
 105 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 223. 
 106 Booker, 543 U.S. at 226. 
 107 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (“Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional 
issues presented by the these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had 
omitted from the SRA [“Sentencing Reform Act”] the provisions that make the 
Guidelines binding on district judges . . . [f]or when a trial judge exercises his discretion 
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One approach, endorsed vigorously by Justice Stevens in his 
dissent,109 called for preserving the text of the Act but “superimposing” 
the Sixth Amendment requirements.110 However, the majority ultimately 
rejected Stevens’ approach in favor of altering the explicit text of the 
Act.111 The Court reasoned that Congress would prefer excision—
removing the mandatory language within the text of the Act—to outright 
invalidation or engrafting a Sixth Amendment requirement directly onto 
the statute.112 Thus excision, the majority reasoned, would cure the 
constitutional infirmity while maintaining congressional intent, to the 
extent possible.113 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), 
the portion of the statute that required mandatory imposition of a 
Guidelines sentence.114 However, removing section 3553(b)(1) also 
required excision of section 3742(e), the section of the Act that provided 
a de novo standard of review for sentences on appeal.115 The Court 
reasoned that the excision was necessary because the provision contained 
“critical cross-references” to section 3553(b)(1).116 In addition, the Court 
opted to replace de novo review with reasonableness review, noting that 
the sentencing statute had previously directed courts to determine if 
sentences outside of the Guidelines range were “unreasonable” in light of 
the section 3553(a) factors.117 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia attacked the foundations of 
the remedial majority’s holding, particularly the reasonableness standard 
                                                                                                             
to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”). 
 108 Justice Breyer delivered the remedial portion of the opinion, joined by Justices 
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg. 
 109 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 110 Id. at 247. 
 111 Id. at 249. The majority did not agree with Justice Stevens that the language of the 
mandatory provision was facially constitutional. (“This provision makes it difficult to 
justify Justice Stevens’ approach, for that approach requires reading the words ‘the court’ 
as if they meant ‘the judge working with the jury.’ Unlike Justice Stevens, we do not 
believe we can interpret the statute’s language to save its constitutionality, because we 
believe that any such reinterpretation, even if limited to the instances in which a Sixth 
Amendment problem arises would be ‘plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.’”) Id. at 
250 (internal citations omitted). 
 112 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 248–51, 258. 
 113 See id. at 258. 
 114 Id. at 259. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 260. 
 117 Id. Congress enacted section 3742(e) setting forth the de novo standard of review 
in response to Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), which held that sentences were 
to be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 
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of review.118 Among Justice Scalia’s many criticisms regarding the 
majority’s decision to excise section 3742(e)119 was the concern that the 
new reasonableness standard could function to perpetuate the very 
system held unconstitutional.120 In ominous language, Justice Scalia 
suggested that “unreasonableness review will produce a discordant 
symphony of different standards, varying from court to court and judge 
to judge . . . .”121 Indeed, the practical effects of the reasonableness 
standard of review resulted in significant litigation, prompting the 
Supreme Court to address the differing approaches among the circuits to 
the application of the new standard.122 
F. Rita v. United States: A Presumption of Reasonableness for Within-
Guidelines Sentences 
One approach to reasonableness review emerged in the form of a 
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guideline sentences.123 In Rita 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court could 
apply such a presumption.124 The government convicted Rita of perjury 
for lying to a grand jury under oath.125 Prior to sentencing, a probation 
officer prepared a pre-sentence report and calculated Rita’s sentencing 
range as between thirty-three and forty-one months under the 
Guidelines.126  
During the sentencing hearing, Rita’s attorney argued for a sentence 
below the applicable Guidelines range, citing reasons not taken into 
account by the Guidelines.127 The judge sentenced Rita to thirty-three 
                                                                                                             
 118 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 303–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 119 Justice Scalia decried the majority’s inconsistency of excising section 3742(e) 
while leaving intact several provisions that specify dispositions based on terminations 
made under the provision as “rather like deleting the ingredients portion of a recipe and 
telling the cook to proceed with the preparation portion.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 307. Justice 
Scalia also rejected the majority’s logic in replacing an explicit standard of review by 
relying on implications of the remaining statute. Id. (“The question is, when the Court has 
severed that standard of review . . . does it make any sense to look for some congressional 
‘implication’ of a different standard of review in the remnants of the statute that the Court 
has left standing? Only in Wonderland.”) Id. at 309 (emphasis in original). 
 120 Id. at 311–12 (“[T]he remedial majority’s gross exaggerations . . . may lead some 
courts to conclude—may indeed be designed to lead courts of appeals to conclude—that 
little has changed.”). 
 121 Id. at 312. 
 122 See supra note 9. 
 123 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007). 
 124 Id. at 2459. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 2461. 
 127 Id. Rita argued that because of his prior employment in criminal justice, his 
military experience, and his poor physical health, a below-guideline sentence was 
therefore appropriate. 
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months, the lower end of the Guidelines range, stating that he was 
“unable to find that the [reports’ recommended] sentencing guideline 
range . . . is an inappropriate guideline range . . . .”128 In affirming the 
sentence, the Fourth Circuit stated that “a sentence imposed within the 
properly calculated Guidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.”129 
Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the majority, concluded that a 
circuit court could legally apply a presumption of reasonableness.130 He 
explained that the presumption merely reflected the fact that both the 
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission arrived at the same 
conclusion.131 Justice Breyer asserted that this “double determination” 
resulted in an increased probability that the sentence was reasonable.132 
In addition to permitting the presumption of reasonableness, the 
Rita opinion reflects the Supreme Court’s view of the relationship 
between substantive and procedural reasonableness review. Procedurally, 
the Court determined that the district court’s allocution under section 
3553(c)—the provision requiring the judge to “state in open court the 
reasons for its imposition for the particular sentence”—was adequate.133  
According to the opinion, such a statement should “set forth enough to 
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments 
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking 
authority.”134  
The Court found that the judge’s statement indicating the 
Guidelines range was not “inappropriate” and was thus procedurally 
sufficient.135 The majority then turned to the substance of Rita’s 
sentence, upholding as appropriate the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that 
the special circumstances provided by the defendant were not “special 
enough” to warrant a below-Guidelines sentence. 136 
In dissent, Justice Souter argued that a presumption of 
reasonableness would undermine Apprendi, effectively returning courts 
to a pre-Booker mandatory sentencing regime.137 The “gravitational pull” 
                                                                                                             
 128 Id. at 2462. 
 129 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2470 (2007). 
 130 Id. at 2459. 
 131 Id. at 2463. 
 132 Id. at 2465 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than 
having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when 
the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate 
application of section 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is 
reasonable.”). 
 133 Id. at 2468–69. 
 134 Id. at 2468. 
 135 Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007). 
 136 Id. at 2470. 
 137 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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of attaching a presumption to within-Guidelines sentences, Justice Souter 
argued, “would tend to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly 
as mandatory Guidelines had done, with judges finding the facts needed 
for a sentence in an upper subrange.”138 Justice Souter proposed that an 
appellate court should apply an across-the-board standard of 
reasonableness to ensure that the entire range of statutorily authorized 
sentences were available to the sentencing judge, in order to discourage 
judges from imposing “appeal-proof” sentences within the Guidelines or 
perpetuating the constitutional violations Booker sought to remedy.139 
G. Gall v. United States: The Proportionality Principle 
In Gall v. United States,140 the Supreme Court held that a strict 
application of the “proportionality principle” was an improper 
application of reasonableness review.141 In essence, the doctrine requires 
the sentencing court to support a sentence falling outside the Guidelines 
range by a justification that is “proportional to the extent of the 
difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.”142 
Gall, who entered into a plea agreement with the government, was 
sentenced to a term of probation for thirty-six months, a 100% departure 
from the thirty to thirty-seven-month imprisonment range under the 
Guidelines.143 
The district court judge issued a lengthy sentencing memorandum 
listing several factors in support of the sentence under section 3553: 
[T]he Defendant’s explicit withdrawal from the conspiracy 
almost four years before the filing of the indictment, the 
Defendant’s post offense conduct, especially obtaining a college 
degree and the start of his own successful business, the support of 
family and friends, lack of criminal history, and his age at the 
time of the offense conduct, all warrant the sentence imposed . . . 
.144 
Thus, the sentencing court provided a substantial list of factors to support 
a below-Guidelines sentence of probation. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 138 Id. at 2487. 
 139 Id. at 2488. 
 140 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 141 Id. at 591. The Court initially agreed to resolve the issue in United States v. 
Claiborne, 127 U.S. 2245 (2007); however, Claiborne’s untimely death mooted the case 
and delayed the Court’s consideration of the issue into the following term. 
 142 See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594. 
 143 Id. at 592–93. 
 144 Id. 
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reversed, holding that there were not sufficient “extraordinary 
circumstances” to support such an “extraordinary variance.”145 
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of the 
proportionality principle, characterizing the doctrine as a “rigid 
mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the 
standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a 
specific sentence.”146 Such an approach, the majority argued, would 
“come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of 
unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range”147 and 
undermine the abuse of discretion standard of review by applying a 
heightened standard for below-Guidelines sentences.148  
The Supreme Court then went on to apply the reasonableness 
standard of review, both procedurally and substantively, to Gall’s 
sentence. The Court concluded that the district judge was within his 
discretion and that the Eighth Circuit inappropriately applied what 
amounted to de novo review.149 
As illustrated by the above cases, the transformation of the 
mandatory Guidelines scheme originally envisioned by Congress to 
reasonableness review under an advisory Guidelines system has been 
arduous. From the initial Sixth Amendment challenges through the state 
sentencing laws in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely to the repudiation of 
mandatory federal Guidelines in Booker, the Supreme Court has 
struggled to fashion a coherent system that maintains the Congressional 
vision of a unified system, while simultaneously curing the inherent 
constitutional defects. Rita and Gall represent the Supreme Court’s latest 
attempt to guide the sentencing process and resolve the constitutionality 
of the various mechanisms the circuits have adopted.  
Although the Supreme Court has established additional parameters 
by endorsing a presumption of reasonableness in Rita and rejecting the 
proportionality principle in Gall, the following cases illustrate how the 
scope of reasonableness review is far from settled. 
                                                                                                             
 145 Id. 
 146 Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 595. 
 149 Id. at 601. 
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD:                    
A PARADIGM OF CONFUSION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Rita, the exact scope and 
operation of reasonableness review remains elusive and divisive.150 
Statistical data suggests that post-Booker appellate courts have been 
reluctant to reverse as substantively unreasonable sentences within the 
Guidelines,151 affirm sentences with a substantial downward variance,152 
and reverse above-Guidelines sentences.153  
Since Rita, appeals courts throughout the circuits have interpreted 
substantive reasonableness review as endorsing, at least on some level, 
an evaluation of the underlying reason for imposition of a particular 
sentence.154 The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tomko155 
                                                                                                             
 150 See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., 
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 151 Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85 
DENV. U. L. REV. 31 (2007) (The New York Council of Defense Lawyers (“NYCDL”) as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners stated that circuit courts reversed only one within-
Guidelines sentence as substantially unreasonable out of 1,152 sentences since Rita.). 
 152 Id. Data compiled by the NYCDL showed that 78.3 percent of below-Guideline 
sentences appealed by the government were  reversed, compared to 3.5 percent of above-
range sentences appealed by the defense. Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a downward 
sentencing departure unreasonable in light of section 3553 factors); United States v. 
Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court did not 
appropriately weigh the factors under section 3553); United States v. Bradford, 500 F.3d 
808 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the sentence reflected an overemphasis on the 
relevance of the details of the offense and the defendant’s history under section 
3553(a)(1) and accorded insufficient weight to existing congressional policy and the need 
to minimize sentencing disparities); United States v. Hatcher, 501 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 
2007) (reversing sentence because the district court gave too much weight to an improper 
factor); United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the 
district court ignored Congress’s policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more 
severe punishment, and failed to distinguish defendant from other career offenders); 
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated, 
reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing sentence as substantially 
unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh sentencing factors); 
United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing sentence because 
the district court placed too much weight on an irrelevant factor); United States v. 
D’Amico, 496 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality review and reversing 
sentence as substantially unreasonable). But see United States v. Sanchez-Ramirez, 497 
F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding an above-Guidelines sentence as reasonable in light 
of the defendant’s egregious conduct); United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316 (6th Cir. 
2007); United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming within-
Guidelines sentence as substantially reasonable and applying a presumption of 
reasonableness); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
below-Guidelines sentence as substantively reasonable). 
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and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wachowiak156 are 
indicative of the challenges circuit courts face in balancing procedure 
and substance in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Rita.157 
A. United States v. Tomko 
In United States v. Tomko,158 the Third Circuit reversed as 
unreasonable a sentence that was substantially below the Guidelines 
range.159 Tomko pled guilty to tax evasion and received a sentence of 
250 hours of community service, three years probation, and a $250,000 
fine. The trial court imposed this noncustodial sentence despite a 
recommended Guidelines range of twelve to eighteen months of 
imprisonment.160 In addition, the sentencing judge provided a 
comprehensive list of reasons for the sentence, taking into account the 
section 3553 factors.161 
Acknowledging that the standard of review “is akin to abuse of 
discretion and accordingly deferential,”162 the Third Circuit framed the 
scope of review as a determination of “whether the district judge 
imposed the sentence he or she did for reasons that are logical and 
consistent with the factors set forth in 3553(a).”163 The Third Circuit 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Rita as emphasizing the role 
of the appellate courts in providing substantive oversight.164 Thus, the 
                                                                                                             
 155 Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting), 
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 156 United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 157 A number of cases have responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall; 
Tomko and Wachowiak were chosen because of their comprehensive analysis of Rita. 
 158 Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting), 
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). The case was subsequently vacated. 
However, this does not change the relevance of the opinion, and perhaps further 
illustrates the difficulties that the circuits face in applying the reasonableness standard of 
review. United States v. Tomko, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 988 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) 
(order vacating judgment and granting rehearing). 
 159 Tomko, 498 F.3d at 158. 
 160 Id. at 162. 
 161 Id. (After considering the section 3553 factors in detail, the sentencing judge 
stated, “[h]owever, this need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records also gives me enough leniency to understand that there are 
differences and those differences have to be taken into account. I recognize the need for 
consistent sentencing; however, in this case, given the defendant’s lack of any significant 
criminal history, his involvement in exceptional charitable work and community activity, 
and his acceptance of responsibility, we find that a sentence that is mitigated by the 
factors of 3553 are [sic] warranted.”). 
 162 Id. at 163 (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)). 
 163 Tomko, 498 F.3d at 163 (quoting United v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
 164 Tomko, 498 F.3d at 163. 
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Third Circuit suggested that “reasonableness review, while deferential, is 
not utterly impotent.”165 Consequently, the court concluded that proper 
substantive review requires actual reweighing of the section 3553 
factors.166 In the final analysis, the Third Circuit disagreed with the 
district court that the sentence imposed reflected the seriousness of the 
crime, and held that the mitigating factors did not justify such a 
substantial departure from the Guidelines sentence.167 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Smith criticized the majority’s approach, 
equating the standard actually applied by the majority to a de novo 
standard of review and a misapplication of the principles in Rita.168 The 
dissent noted that the district court gave meaningful consideration to the 
section 3553 factors and applied them in a reasonable manner to the 
individual facts of the case.169 Thus, Judge Smith asserted, even though 
the majority would have applied the section 3553 factors differently, a 
district court’s sentence should be affirmed absent a showing that the 
sentencing judge failed to give meaningful consideration to the 
sentencing factors.170 A reweighing of factors, the dissent asserted, is 
tantamount to de novo review, and improper under Booker.171 
Moreover, Judge Smith suggested that by focusing exclusively on 
the substance of the district court’s decision, the majority separated 
substance from procedure in a manner inconsistent with the majority 
opinion in Rita.172 According to the dissent, the majority’s emphasis on 
the trial court’s treatment of the section 3553 factors rather than the 
                                                                                                             
 165 Id. at 165. 
 166 Id. at 165 n.7 (“To put it figuratively, there is a recipe for reasonableness that in 
many, if not most cases, will lead to a palatable result, and we are not in a position to 
protest if the result is a little too sweet or bitter for our taste. However, when a number of 
key ingredients prescribed by that recipe are obviously missing from the mix, we cannot 
ignore the omission and feign satisfaction—we are obliged to point out there is no proof 
in the pudding.”). 
 167 Id. at 172 (“Viewed cumulatively, the three factors considered by the District 
Court as mitigating factors—negligible criminal history, support and ties in the 
community and charitable work, employment record—pale in comparison to the 
numerous section 3553(a) factors suggesting that a term of imprisonment is warranted in 
cases of tax evasion as willful and brazen as Tomko’s. A sentence of mere probation, in 
light of these factors, is unreasonable and it was an abuse of discretion for the District 
Court to impose it. We do not rule that any below-Guidelines sentence would have been 
improper in this case, only that the District Court abused its discretion in rendering this 
particular below-Guidelines sentence.”). 
 168 Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting), 
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 169 See id. at 174. 
 170 Judge Smith noted that he would have imposed a term of imprisonment. Id. at 177. 
 171 Id. at 174. 
 172 Id. at 183 (“The Supreme Court in Rita repeatedly stressed the importance of the 
process by which the sentencing court arrives at its conclusion.”). 
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process by which the court arrived at its result illustrated this 
inconsistency. Judge Smith viewed the majority’s approach as eroding 
the remedial portion of Booker to create confusion among sentencing 
courts in determining the “spectrum of cases that are ineligible for 
substantial variances regardless of the reasons given by that judge.”173 
B. United States v. Wachowiak 
In United States v. Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit embraced the 
reasoning reflected by the dissent in Tomko, affirming a below-
Guidelines sentence as reasonable.174 Wachowiak pled guilty to receiving 
child pornography and received a seventy-month term of imprisonment 
despite a recommended Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months.175 The 
sentencing judge concluded that the Guidelines sentence was “greater 
than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes of section 3553(a)” 
based on several mitigating circumstances, an individual assessment of 
the section 3553(a) factors, and a determination that the Guidelines did 
not adequately account for the appropriate individual circumstances of 
the case.176 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence, stating that a 
reasonable sentence should reflect a “meaningful consideration [of] 
sentencing factors enumerated in section 3553(a), including the advisory 
sentencing guidelines.”177 Accordingly, the court indicated that a 
sentence sufficiently justified by considering the proper statutory factors 
should survive substantive reasonableness review.178 The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the district court’s sentence, “though certainly lenient 
given the seriousness of the crime, lies tolerably within the boundaries of 
permissible difference of judicial opinion.” 179 Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
recognized that the yardstick of substantive reasonableness represents a 
range of discretionary sentences.180 However, it conceded that some 
sentences would continue to fall outside the bounds of reasonableness.181 
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Ultimately, both Tomko and Wachowiak illustrate the difficult 
issues confronting circuit courts when applying the reasonableness 
standard of review after Rita. The sentencing judges scrutinized in 
Tomko and Wachowiak provided comprehensive explanations of the 
reasons underlying their imposed sentences. However, the sentence 
imposed in Tomko represents a greater departure from the Guidelines 
than the sentence imposed in Wachowiak.182 Based on the court’s tone in 
Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit would likely have reversed a sentence 
closer to the statutory minimum on substantive grounds.183 On the other 
hand, the dissent in Tomko suggests that only a stripped down procedural 
review can effectively preserve the integrity of the remedy mandated by 
Booker.184 Although they represent early reactions, both Tomko and 
Wachowiak provide a sampling of judicial adherence to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rita. These divergent applications exemplify the 
legal uncertainty that follows the decision. 
IV. RITA AND GALL DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE 
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
Although the Supreme Court focused on narrow issues in both Rita 
and Gall, the majority opinions in both cases discussed at length the 
proper application and theoretical underpinnings of reasonableness 
review.185 These decisions ultimately failed to adequately address many 
of the criticisms of reasonableness review, forestalling the resolution of 
several patent flaws identified by commentators and judges alike.186 
Specifically, but by no means exhaustively, the Supreme Court: (1) 
endorsed a presumption of reasonableness that further insulates within-
Guidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory Guidelines system; 
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(2) failed to provide adequate guidance for both appellate and district 
courts as to the scope and application of substantive reasonableness 
review; (3) left intact a conception of substantive review vulnerable to 
as-applied constitutional challenges; and (4) issued opinions replete with 
misguided Guidelines-centric language that frustrates the remedial 
mandate of Booker. 
A. The Presumption of Reasonableness Insulates Within-Guidelines 
Sentences to Create a De Facto Mandatory Guidelines System 
The issue addressed in Rita—whether or not appellate courts could use a 
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences— 
provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to slow the re-emerging 
prominence of the Guidelines in sentencing.187 However, the Court 
succeeded in accomplishing the opposite result by wholeheartedly 
approving a presumption that further insulates within-Guidelines 
sentences, creating what amounts to a de facto mandatory guideline 
system. In fact, the decision in Rita contained language that suggests 
such a desired result.188 For example, Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, observed that a “presumption, even if it increases the likelihood 
that the judge, not the jury, will find ‘sentencing facts,’ does not violate 
the Sixth Amendment.”189 In support of this contention, Justice Breyer 
argued that a non-binding presumption does not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment because a non-binding presumption neither requires nor 
forbids any sentence within the statutory range of sentences available.190  
Interestingly, Justice Breyer’s argument implies that a presumption 
of reasonableness does not legally affect the advisory system, even if the 
actual result is to increase the frequency of within-Guidelines sentences 
to levels consistent with a pre-Booker mandatory system.191 Therefore, 
the majority was not concerned if the actual result of the presumption 
created a “gravitational pull” toward the Guidelines, because such a 
result would not render the advisory scheme unconstitutional.192 Justice 
                                                                                                             
 187 The Court was presented with an opportunity to issue an opinion consistent with 
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Breyer asserted that this result is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, 
and also consistent with the policies of Congress.193 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens discounted the effect of 
the presumption’s “gravitational pull,” arguing that the abuse-of-
discretion standard, explicitly provided in Booker, requires deference to 
sentences which consider the section 3553 factors.194 This position is 
subtly distinct from the majority’s position. Justice Stevens suggested 
that the standard of review protects sentencing judges and therefore 
judges should not, at least in theory, be obligated to impose within-
Guidelines sentences,195 whereas the majority’s position appears to 
encourage such a result.196 Despite Justice Stevens’ complacency with 
the abuse of discretion standard, empirical data has suggested that 
appellate courts are unwilling to countenance sentences falling outside of 
the Guidelines range.197 
In essence, Rita’s endorsement of a presumption of reasonableness 
is difficult to reconcile with the advisory Guidelines system mandated in 
Booker. The Rita majority’s position rested on the premise that the 
presumption does not require judges to impose within-Guidelines 
sentences.198 While this may be true, the practical effect has been to 
insulate Guidelines sentences by implicitly encouraging judges to impose 
within-Guidelines sentences. Such a system effectively mirrors the pre-
Booker scheme.199  
Justice Souter argued that if Booker is to have any meaning at all, 
judges must be free to depart from the Guidelines.200 As he warned in his 
dissent, if judges treat the Guidelines as “persuasive or presumptively 
appropriate, the Booker remedy would in practical terms preserve the 
very feature of the Guidelines that threatened to trivialize the jury 
right.”201 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Rita approving the presumption 
of reasonableness only serves to insulate within-Guidelines sentences, 
creating a de facto mandatory system. Such a system merely pays lip 
service to the advisory scheme designed to remedy the constitutional 
defects identified in Booker. 
                                                                                                             
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 2470 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 195 Id. 
 196 See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 197 See Hofer, supra note 151, at 31 (Data compiled by the NYCDL showed that 78.3 
percent of below-Guideline sentences appealed by the government were reversed.). 
 198 See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 199 See Tomko, 498 F.3d  at 173 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 200 Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 201 Id. 
2008] Is Substantive Review Reasonable? 473 
B. Substantive Reasonableness Review Remains an Ambiguous Standard 
of Review 
The Supreme Court’s conception of substantive review remains 
ambiguous and difficult to apply. The dissent in Tomko asserted that the 
“gravitational pull” toward a within-Guidelines sentence created by 
substantive review is even greater than that of a “nonbinding appellate 
presumption,” because it encourages judges to impose within-Guidelines 
sentences.202 While the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Rita 
provides some clues as to the appropriate sentencing procedure courts are 
to utilize, the interaction between substance and procedure remains 
ambiguous.203 
For instance, the majority in Rita spends considerable time 
discussing the sentencing analysis a district court should implement.204 
The Court explained that the “sentencing judge should set forth enough 
to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ 
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 
decisionmaking authority.”205 The threshold of this “reasoned basis” in 
the facts of the case was apparently fairly low206 and somehow 
proportional to the conceptual complexity of the arguments presented.207 
The Court further explained that the “sentencing judge has access to, and 
greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant 
before him than the Commission or the appeals court,” which allows the 
sentencing judge to utilize his “reasoned sentencing judgment, resting 
upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through [18 
U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’s list of factors.” 208 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s intended scope of procedural 
review is not entirely clear.209 The Court has emphasized a reasoned 
analysis of the section 3553 factors informed by the Guidelines and even 
suggests that a party can argue that “the Guidelines’ sentence itself fails 
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properly to reflect § 3553(a),”210 but it has never explained the practical 
implications of this statement. As illustrated in Tomko, the circuit courts 
enjoy little guidance regarding the extent of substantive review, and have 
interpreted Rita to mean that substantive reasonableness review allows 
an appellate court to re-weigh the section 3553 factors for sentencing.211 
Similarly, Gall reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
both substantive and procedural review.212 The Court reiterated that 
reasonableness review should give due deference to the district courts 
and that the “reasoned and reasonable decision that [the district court 
gave] the section 3553 factors, on the whole, justified the [defendant’s 
probationary] sentence.”213  
The analysis consisted of a determination that the Eighth Circuit’s 
arguments against imposition of the sentence of probation, based on 
section 3553, did not overcome the rational arguments asserted by the 
lower court. While Gall established that “proportionality” review goes 
too far and that “the extent of the difference between a particular 
sentence and the recommended Guidelines range” are relevant to the 
inquiry, 214 it remains unclear exactly when an appeals court may 
overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable.215 
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C. Reasonableness Review is Still Vulnerable to As-Applied 
Constitutional Challenges 
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Rita, criticized the 
majority opinion as avoiding the constitutional issues presented by the 
reasonableness standard of review.216 Scalia’s basic argument, admittedly 
not presented directly by the circumstances in Rita or Gall, is that, under 
the substantive reasonableness review endorsed by the Supreme Court, 
there will be some sentences upheld as reasonable based solely on judge-
found facts, which under Booker represents an unconstitutional 
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Thus, Scalia argued, 
reasonableness review is vulnerable to as-applied constitutional 
challenges.217 
Scalia illustrated his point with hypotheticals.218 The “two brothers” 
hypothetical assumed that the government convicted two brothers of 
robbing a bank; one chose the particular bank because of racial bias, the 
other because of the perception that the bank’s location would be 
advantageous.219 Both brothers receive the maximum sentence under the 
statute.220 On review, Justice Scalia contended, the appellate court would 
reverse the sentence of the “non-racist” brother as unreasonable and 
affirm the sentence of the biased brother.221 The racially-biased brother’s 
sentence would be lawful only because of a judge-found fact.222  
The second example is a more likely scenario in which aggravating 
factors significantly increase a convicted bank robber’s sentencing range 
under the Guidelines; for example, if the defendant discharged a firearm 
or a victim incurred serious bodily injury.223 Accordingly, a sentence 
would only be reasonable based on the judge-found facts because if these 
facts did not exist, the appellate court would likely reverse the sentence 
as unreasonable.224 Therefore, Justice Scalia explained, the authority to 
review the substance of the district court’s sentence would result in 
sentences that could only be justified on the basis of judge-found facts.225 
Justice Scalia suggested that the constitutional implications are avoided 
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by abandoning substantive reasonableness review altogether and limiting 
appellate courts to review sentences only for procedural deficiencies.226 
In Rita, Justice Breyer dismissed these criticisms of the majority, 
adding that Justice Scalia’s “need to rely on hypotheticals to make his 
point is consistent with our view that the approach adopted here will not 
‘raise a multitude of constitutional problems.’”227 Thus, Justice Breyer 
essentially conceded the point, yet adhered to the belief that the issue 
would arise infrequently.228 This argument, however, is unsatisfactory 
because Booker mandated reasonableness review as a means to cure the 
very same constitutional defect—that increased exposure to heightened 
penalties based on judge-found facts is a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment. Therefore, the only difference between the as-applied 
constitutional defect identified by Justice Scalia and the defect identified 
in Booker is that an appeals court is evaluated in the former and the 
sentencing judge is assessed in the latter. 
D. The Guidelines-centric Approach is Misguided and Frustrates the 
Remedy in Booker 
In many ways, Rita and Gall underscored and endorsed a 
continuing reliance by the federal judiciary on sentences calculated under 
the Guidelines,229 perpetuating a misguided system and frustrating the 
remedy in Booker. The Supreme Court spent very little time discussing 
the actual text of the section 3553 factors, focusing instead on the dual-
reasonableness of the Guidelines while approving a presumption that 
further insulates within-Guidelines sentences.230 
The majority in Rita argued that “where judge and Commission 
both determine that the Guidelines sentences [sic] is an appropriate 
sentence for the case at hand, that sentence likely reflects the 
section 3553(a) factors (including its ‘not greater than necessary’ 
requirement).”231 
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This recognition assumes that sentences under the Guidelines 
actually achieved the goals set forth by Congress under section 3553 and 
that sentencing judges independently determined sentences within 
Congress’s framework. At least one author has criticized these 
assumptions. Judge Nancy Gertner, a district court judge for the District 
of Massachusetts, stated in a recent article on Rita, “Justice Breyer’s 
analysis of the Guidelines rationale reiterates the ideology of the 
Guidelines formation—not their actual genesis or operation.”232 In other 
words, although the Sentencing Commission has adopted the policy 
statements identified by Congress, the resulting sentences do not reflect 
these same goals.233 This issue is arguably most apparent in drug cases. 
Judge Gertner observed: 
You apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as you have been told you 
must, and you tally up the numbers and determine where the 
defendant is on the grid, and ultimately come up with a result that 
makes no sense by any measure. It is inconsistent with the 
purposes of sentencing in the Sentencing Reform Act . . . it is out 
of proportion to the defendant’s culpability and to sentences that 
have been meted out for far worse, even violent offenses; it is not 
at all what the public—if they knew all the facts—would 
demand.234 
In essence, Judge Gertner identified a fundamental disconnect between 
the Guidelines and the penological polices identified by Congress. 
The discrepancy between the Congressional goals and the sentences 
produced by the Guidelines might be explained by the Guidelines’ 
predominant focus on offense conduct.235 Offense conduct relates to the 
defendant’s actions during the commission of the crime, such as 
brandishing a weapon, the amount of harm suffered by the victim, or the 
class of crime committed.236 Offender characteristics relate to the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s history.237 The district court 
typically considers both offense conduct and offense characteristics.238 
However, the Guidelines tend only to focus on offense conduct, 
discounting a number of offender characteristics as “not ordinarily 
relevant” such as “age; education and vocational skills; mental and 
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emotional conditions; physical condition; employment record; family ties 
and responsibilities; previous military, public or charitable service; and 
lack of guidance as a youth.”239  
Significantly, the Guidelines Manual exempts from this list the 
defendant’s criminal history, which, along with offense category, 
establishes the defendant’s applicable sentence range.240 Consequently, 
the Guidelines directly contradict the Sentencing Act, which instructs a 
court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant.”241 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s continued focus on the Guidelines 
as the centerpiece of sentencing reinforces a tendency among sentencing 
judges to apply a within-Guidelines sentence unless the defendant can 
demonstrate that his individual case warrants a departure.242 Judge 
Gertner identified the district court judge’s comments in Rita as a typical 
example: 
At sentencing, the district court heard Rita’s presentation but 
concluded that it was ‘unable to find that the . . . sentencing 
guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline range for that. . . 
. Clearly, the court’s remarks suggest that Rita had to show that 
he was somehow extraordinary, not the usual person in this 
guideline range.243 
As Judge Gertner observed, the above allocution does not reflect an 
independent determination of reasonableness confirmed by the 
Guidelines, but instead demonstrates rote application of the Guidelines 
absent some showing that a within-Guidelines sentence was 
inappropriate in the case.244 
Additionally, the current Guidelines-centric approach only serves to 
perpetuate the Sixth Amendment constitutional deficiencies the Supreme 
Court sought to eliminate in the remedial portion of Booker. In order to 
cure the constitutional defects of the mandatory system, Booker 
mandated an advisory scheme.245 However, the Supreme Court has 
continued to limit actual discretion by emphasizing the Guidelines as the 
dominant factor and starting point of all sentencing determinations.246 
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Furthermore, substantive reasonableness review insulates within-
Guidelines sentences by enabling appellate courts to overturn sentences 
falling outside of the Guidelines range.247 Thus, while Booker gives a 
judge freedom to depart from the Guidelines, below-Guidelines 
sentences are susceptible to substantive scrutiny akin to de novo 
review.248 The combined effect of this Guidelines-centric approach and 
substantive reasonableness review is a return to a de facto mandatory 
scheme, with “advisory” an empty adjective. Such a system is 
constitutionally repugnant under Booker.249 
Ultimately, Rita and Gall failed to adequately address the 
fundamental flaws of reasonableness review. Rita endorsed a 
presumption of reasonableness that further insulates within-Guidelines 
sentences, creating a de facto mandatory guideline system.250 
Additionally, the Supreme Court failed to provide adequate guidance for 
both appellate and district courts as to the scope and application of 
substantive reasonableness review, leaving circuit courts with the task of 
trying to determine exactly when a sentence reaches the threshold of 
reasonableness. Moreover, the Supreme Court left intact a conception of 
substantive review vulnerable to as-applied constitutional challenge. 
Finally, both Rita and Gall are replete with Guidelines-centric language 
that further frustrates the remedial mandate of Booker. If the Supreme 
Court seeks to fashion a sentencing jurisprudence that passes 
constitutional muster, the Court must effectuate a significant change in 
course.251 
V. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS REVIEW AND A PARSIMONY-
CENTRIC APPROACH WOULD ALLEVIATE THE ISSUES THE SUPREME 
COURT NEGLECTED IN GALL AND RITA 
As discussed above, many of the challenges confronting both 
district and appellate courts stem from a misguided emphasis on the 
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Sentencing Guidelines. Further, appellate courts have essentially 
unfettered authority to review the substance of sentences that deviate 
from those Guidelines. As a result, the Supreme Court has seriously 
jeopardized the advisory system that Booker implemented.  
The Supreme Court may alleviate the critical issues neglected in 
Gall and Rita by developing a parsimony-centric approach to sentencing 
in district courts and by advocating procedural reasonableness review of 
those sentences by the appellate courts. The words “parsimony-centric” 
imply a de-emphasis on the Guidelines. By de-emphasizing the 
importance of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court would promote a more 
holistic approach, enabling the sentencing court to rely on the section 
3553 factors in their entirety. Additionally, a review based on procedure 
would facilitate discretion by limiting review to patently procedural 
flaws. Both of these proposals tend to produce a sentencing scheme that 
is more consistent with the Supreme Court’s remedy in Booker—a 
Guidelines system that is truly advisory. 
The problems associated with substantive reasonableness review 
are twofold. First, the process allows appellate courts to effectively re-
weigh the section 3553 factors, resulting in the erosion of the judicial 
discretion mandated by Booker.252 Second, as Justice Scalia asserted in 
his Rita dissent, substantive review is vulnerable to as-applied 
constitutional challenges.253 The Supreme Court could resolve both 
problems by greatly limiting the scope of reasonableness review by 
appellate courts down to a highly deferential, procedural review. 
Procedural reasonableness review would foreclose as-applied 
constitutional challenges. Under the current conception of substantive 
reasonableness review, the courts of appeals will uphold certain cases as 
reasonable based solely on judge-found facts.254 Although such cases 
would be rare, or at least rarely obvious from the factual circumstances 
of the case,255 this argument underscores the inherent unconstitutionality 
of substantive review. Procedural review would eliminate this issue 
because appellate courts would lose their freedom to independently 
evaluate the sentencing judge’s justifications for the chosen sentence. A 
sentence would not be reasonable or unreasonable based solely on the 
factual determinations of an appeals court.256 Therefore, there will not be 
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an occasion for judicial fact-finding by the appellate courts; a court of 
appeals could only overturn a sentence if it was procedurally deficient.257 
In addition, a stripped-down procedural review would revitalize 
judicial discretion. The remedial decision in Booker laid the groundwork 
for reasonableness review. In Rita, Justice Stevens asserted that Booker 
“plainly contemplated . . . a substantive component.”258 The Supreme 
Court emphasized that, while sentencing judges must impose sentences 
that consider the section 3553 factors, an appellate court could still 
overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable.259 Accordingly, 
substantive reasonableness review effectively allows an appellate court 
to reconsider a sentencing judge’s decision. Such a conception 
essentially draws a line between substance and procedure.260 
However, substance and procedure often overlap.261 Reconfiguring 
the reasonableness standard of review so that courts would elevate 
procedure over substance would not completely eliminate an appeals 
court’s ability to overturn a sentence on substantive grounds. While an 
appellate court could not reweigh the section 3553 factors, a sentence 
issued by a district court based on patently flawed logic, impermissible 
circumstances, or clearly erroneous facts is both substantively and 
procedurally deficient.262 Thus, a procedurally-based review would 
ensure that district court judges truly have discretion to sentence within 
statutory range as long as the sentence reflects a careful consideration of 
the section 3553 factors, including the Guidelines as one factor. 
On balance, the circuit courts have not embraced this view.263 Both 
Tomko and, to a lesser degree, Wachowiak, interpret the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rita as advocating a notion of substantive review where 
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substance outweighs procedure.264 A procedurally-based review would 
likely assuage the dissent in Tomko, which regarded the substantive 
review as trivializing the Booker decision, thus creating uncertainty 
among the district courts.265 Although the Wachowiak court exercised a 
greater degree of deference to the district court, there remains a range of 
sentences, which at some undefined threshold would trigger the court’s 
authority to reverse on substantive grounds.266  
However, Rita and Gall do not preclude procedural substantive 
review. In fact, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on reasoned sentencing in 
both decisions provides the foundation for a departure from the 
Guidelines-centric approach. Professor Berman, a leading commentator 
on sentencing policy, recently remarked that “the Rita decision 
emphasized (though opaquely) the importance of sentencing rulings as 
reasoned decisions . . . the ruling still sent an important signal that 
district and circuit judges should—indeed, must—explore and 
contemplate the reasons for specific sentencing outcomes.”267 Gall 
reflects the Court’s emphasis on procedure and individualized sentencing 
as well.268 
Indeed, the parsimony principle underlies the Sentencing Reform 
Act, which provides that a sentence should be “sufficient but not greater 
than necessary” to achieve the policies enumerated under section 3553.269 
By emphasizing the sentencing factors outlined by Congress, as opposed 
to affording greater weight to the Guidelines, the Supreme Court would 
give greater effect to the advisory system. Such a system would allow a 
judge the freedom to depart from the Guidelines when, in light of the 
section 3553 sentencing factors, the Guideline sentence would result in a 
sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve the basic goals set forth by 
Congress.270 
Ultimately, a procedurally-based reasonableness review coupled 
with a holistic, parsimony-centric approach to sentencing would activate 
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the basic holding in Booker by giving sentencing judges the freedom to 
impose a sentence within the full statutory range. While Rita and Gall 
appear to embrace the Guidelines as the center of sentencing 
jurisprudence, they do not preclude a departure from substantive review.  
The Supreme Court decided Booker to prevent judges from finding 
facts that permit them to impose sentences that contravene the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury. Continued application of substance-
dominated review discourages the very judicial discretion central to an 
advisory scheme. Moreover, substantive review is vulnerable to as-
applied constitutional challenges. Finally, an emphasis on the parsimony 
principle rather than the Guidelines would return the Guidelines system 
to its proper place as one factor among several policy considerations 
identified by Congress as appropriate in sentencing. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Sentencing jurisprudence is a highly important and significant area 
of law that is easily consumed by abstract complexities. In United States 
v. Booker,271 the Court held that the application of the Guidelines would 
no longer be mandatory and that appellate courts would review sentences 
for reasonableness. For better or for worse, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Booker implemented an advisory Guidelines system designed to 
ensure that people convicted of crimes receive sentences on the basis of 
facts proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.272 In United States v. 
Booker,273 the Court held that the application of the Guidelines would no 
longer be mandatory and that appellate courts would review sentences 
for reasonableness.274  
In an attempt to apply the reasonableness standard, the circuit 
courts have devised different doctrines for determining when a sentence 
is in fact unreasonable.275 The Supreme Court addressed the validity of 
two of these doctrines in Rita v. United States276 and Gall v. United 
States.277 Rita held that a presumption of reasonableness for within-
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Guidelines sentences is not inconsistent with the advisory Guidelines.278 
In Gall, however, the Supreme Court held that the circuits cannot apply 
the so-called “proportionality principle,” a standard that would overturn 
sentencing decisions that do not provide proportional reasons for 
deviating from a Guidelines sentence.279 Although the Court reconciled 
these specific approaches with reasonableness review, the exact scope of 
reasonableness review remains ambiguous. 
Tomko280 and Wachowiak281 indicate the ambiguity of 
reasonableness review among the circuits. While reaching different 
results, the Third and Seventh Circuits construed Rita as approving a 
substantively-based standard of review in which appellate courts can 
reverse sentences deemed to be substantively unreasonable.282 Despite 
disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the Wachowiak court upheld the 
lower court’s sentence, citing Rita for the proposition that appellate 
courts should afford a high level of deference to the district court.283 The 
Tomko court essentially reconsidered the section 3553 factors, finding 
the justifications offered by the sentencing judge to be inadequate.284 
Taken together, the cases reflect a core disagreement among the circuit 
courts over the scope of substantive review. 
Ultimately, Rita and Gall failed to address the fundamental flaws 
inherent in reasonableness review in a number of different ways. First, 
the presumption of reasonableness only serves to insulate and encourage 
Guideline sentences, threatening the very foundations of the remedial 
portion of Booker.285 Second, the majorities in both Rita and Gall 
continue to privilege the Guidelines and endorse a substantive 
reasonableness review in which the appellate courts can effectively 
reweigh sentencing factors.286 This “gravitational pull” toward the 
Guidelines further frustrates the Booker remedy and prevents judges 
from exercising any meaningful discretion.287 Third, substantive 
reasonableness review is vulnerable to as-applied constitutional 
challenges similar to those addressed in Booker, except appellate judges 
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determine the facts necessary to support a reasonable sentence in those 
instances, rather than trial judges.288 Finally, the Supreme Court 
continues to endorse a Guidelines-centric approach to sentencing that 
fails to effectively fulfill the goals outlined by Congress under section 
3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act.289 
An approach that elevates procedure over substance, along with a 
holistic, parsimony-centric reliance on the statutory factors outlined by 
Congress, would effectively alleviate these fundamental flaws. 
Sentencing judges could then exercise meaningful discretion that is 
integral to the protection of the constitutional rights of criminal 
defendants and to the preservation of the Supreme Court’s remedial 
holding in Booker. Additionally, a procedurally-based system would 
eliminate as-applied constitutional challenges based on judicial fact 
finding by appellate courts.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court should encourage sentencing judges 
to account for all of the sentencing factors set forth by Congress, 
including, but not privileging, the Sentencing Guidelines. This approach 
would ensure that sentences are “sufficient but not greater than 
necessary” in accordance with the overarching provision set forth by 
Congress in section 3553.290 As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in 
Rita, “[i]t is all too real that advisory Guidelines sentences routinely 
change months and years of imprisonment to decades and centuries on 
the basis of judge-found facts—as Booker itself recognized.”291 Perhaps 
the Court will finally become cognizant of the practical implications of 
sentencing jurisprudence when it inevitably faces the next round of 
challenges to reasonableness review. 
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